There's no such thing as Universally Preferable Behaviour

Universally preferable behavior is the name of Stefan Malan's book arguing for an objective non-religious foundation for morality.

Uh, I'll begin by saying I don't believe that anything that could fairly be called objective morality exists. Uh, so categorical imperatives are statements like you should not kill, or you should strive to minimize suffering, or you should not initiate force. Categorical imperatives are true and apply with equal force to any person, no matter what the person's aims or values may be.

Now, I see no good reason to believe that categorical imperatives exist, and I'll try and explain how Malan's attempt to show otherwise fails. Uh, the problems start for me at least in the chapter entitled "Self-Defeating Arguments." This part of the book seems to be a repackaging of the concept of argumentation ethics. In this section, Malan tries to establish the existence of universal preferences.

The book goes further, but since it attempts to build on the foundations that are laid out in this section, uh, it's enough I think to show the problems with this foundation. Under the section entitled "Arguments and Universality," Malan writes, "If I choose to debate, I have implicitly accepted a wide variety of premises that are worth spending some time to unpack." Here he runs through a few premises that I don't see a direct problem with, and then he gets to premise four: "Correction requires universal preferences."

Um, he writes, "If you correct me on an error that I have made, you are implicitly accepting the fact that it would be better for me to correct my error. Your preference for me to correct my error is not subjective but objective and universal." Um, but this is not necessarily the case. Sorry, that was the end of the quote.

Uh, if we correct someone, the possibility is open that we're doing so because the correction helps the realization of our subjective preferences. For instance, if I prefer to help people and I consider that you value the truth, then I might do my best to help you see the truth as best I understand it.

Correcting you, in this case, does not implicitly mean that I depend on the assumption that holding true beliefs is better in any absolute sense than holding false ones. It leaves open the possibility that, as far as realizing a certain set of subjective preferences is concerned, it may well be better to hold certain false beliefs rather than certain true ones. Corrections imply that one or both parties have a preference for truth, not that truth is objectively better than falsehood.

Uh, later on, he has premise six: "Truth is better than falsehood." So I've already been talking a bit about this. Uh, here's what Malan says: "If I tell you that the world is flat and you reply that the world is not flat but round, then you are implicitly accepting the axiom that truth and falsehood both exist objectively and that truth is better than falsehood." End quote.

But to restate the previous objection, this isn't necessarily the case. There are lots of reasons I may correct you about the shape of the planet. I may simply feel that telling the truth in this instance is more desirable with regard to satisfying my preferences than lying would be. I don't need to assume that truth is better than falsehood in any absolute sense.

Uh, and it goes on; Malan makes the same kind of mistake repeatedly. Uh, premise seven is, "Peaceful debating is the best way to resolve disputes." Malan writes, "If you told me in advance that you would deal with any disagreement by shooting me, I would be unlikely to engage in a debate with you. Thus, it is clear that any debate relies on the implicit premise that evidence, reason, truth, and objectivity are the universally preferable methods of resolving disputes between individuals."

Uh, but here again—sorry, that's the end of the quote—but here again, there are many reasons a person may debate peacefully that are consistent with non-acceptance of this premise.

Uh, we can sum up these reasons with the following hypothetical statement: "Debating peacefully is the best way to satisfy my subjective preferences in this particular situation." In certain other situations, I may derive better satisfaction of my values from physically assaulting the person I'm disagreeing with.

So for instance, consider that some people feel the desire to show themselves to be physically powerful in front of others, or some may imply violence to demonstrate to onlookers the intensity of their disagreement with whatever claim or suggestion has just been made. There are lots of possible reasons that violence may sometimes be chosen and sometimes be judged to serve a person's preferences better than peaceful debate.

So, Malan's claim that peaceful debate implicitly conveys a sense to the idea that nonviolence is universally preferable is false. Premise eight is, "Individuals are responsible for their actions."

Um, Malan says, "If my argument that human beings are not responsible for their actions is true, then I am not responsible for my argument and you are not responsible for your reply. However, if I believe that you are not responsible for your reply, it would make precious little sense to advance an argument. It would be exactly the same as arguing with the television set." Close quote.

Is this really true? Uh, again, there's a problem. Is a deterministic artificial intelligence program responsible for its replies? Perhaps we'd say no, because after all, it can only process inputs in accordance with the way its software functions.

But it's not difficult to imagine a situation in which it would make a great deal of sense to try to persuade an artificial intelligence program about something. For instance, you may try to persuade it to release you from a cell. You do that because success in this attempt at persuasion would help you realize your subjective preferences, including the preference for being able to move around freely.

So despite what Malan claims, it does seem to make sense in certain cases to advance arguments to entities who might—not responsible for their replies. So, Malan concludes this section by stating, "As a result of the above arguments, we can see that it is impossible to enter into any debate without accepting the premise that certain behaviors are universally preferable." End quote.

So, I hope I've shown why the premises he depends on to reach this conclusion are faulty or they're not established. Demonstrating a preference of your own through action or assuming that a certain preference is held by the person you're talking to does not establish that universal preferences exist or even that you believe that they do.

The upshot of all this is that we're left with no good reason to believe that universal preferences, or by extension, universally preferable behavior exists.