Horrific Freefall into the Deepest Ocean | The Sad Story of Flight 447

What's happening? I don't know what's happening. We're losing control of the aircraft here! We lost all control of the aircraft!

What you're witnessing is the beginning of one of aviation's greatest mysteries: a top-notch aircraft, an experienced crew, and a sudden, terrifying descent into the unknown. This is the story of Air France flight 447.

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On May 31st, 2009, around 8:00 p.m. local time, Air France flight 447 was pushed back from the gate at Rio de Janeiro International Airport in Brazil, with destination Paris, France. The route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris crosses the Atlantic Ocean. Starting in Brazil, it travels over the northern Atlantic, approaching the mainland of Europe before landing in Paris. This flight typically takes about 12 hours.

The aircraft involved was an Airbus A330 2000, the newest in Air France's fleet. It underwent a major overhaul in April 2009 and had accumulated about 19,000 flying hours at the time of the incident. Two General Electric CF6 engines powered the aircraft, with no documented issues.

On board were 216 passengers of nearly 30 nationalities. The majority of passengers were French, Brazilian, or German citizens. The passengers included business and holiday travelers. This aircraft is designed for two pilots; however, the 13-hour duty time for the Rio to Paris route exceeds the 10 hours permitted before a break is required, according to Air France's procedures. This duty time includes flight duration and pre-flight preparation.

To comply, flight 447 was crewed by three pilots: the captain, 58-year-old Mark Duo. He had almost 11,000 flying hours, of which more than 6,000 were as a captain, including 1,700 hours on the Airbus A330. The relief first officer, co-pilot in the left seat, 37-year-old David Robar, had more than 6,000 flying hours, with 4,500 hours on this specific aircraft type. The first officer, the co-pilot in the right seat, was 32-year-old Pierre Cedric Bona; he had almost 3,000 flight hours, with 87 of those hours on this aircraft type.

At half past 8 local time, the Airbus took off. The takeoff proceeded normally, as expected for a fully loaded aircraft, following the standard protocols for their climb and setting the course for their transatlantic journey, conforming to Air France's standard procedures. Around 20,000 feet, the relief first officer left the cockpit to begin his 3-hour rest period. The captain took over the left seat while the first officer occupied the right seat.

A few moments later, the flight reached its cruising altitude of flight level 35. The first couple of hours of the flight were largely routine and uneventful. At 1:35 a.m., the flight entered oceanic airspace over the Atlantic Ocean, northeast of the South American continent.

During that time of year, the mid-Atlantic region was known for its typical weather patterns, characterized by a broad band of thunderstorms stretching across the intertropical convergence zone. This region is a band of low pressure around the earth that generally lies near the equator. The trade winds of the northern and southern hemispheres come together here, leading to frequent thunderstorms and heavy rain.

Flying through this area is often challenging for pilots because the thunderstorms don't appear well on radar. Additionally, these storms don't have as much lightning as storms in other places, which can make them seem less severe than they are, especially at night. While the aircraft's automated systems manage the flight, a primary responsibility of the cockpit crew involves overseeing the flight's progress, using the onboard weather radar to avoid areas of significant turbulence.

Air France flight 447 encountered an area of tropical showers and weak thunderstorms, characterized by weak to moderate updrafts and a high likelihood of turbulence. The crew discussed their desire to climb to flight level 370 to ascend above the weather, but they found it too warm to climb to that altitude. Warm air is thinner, reducing the lift the plane can generate, which is crucial for maintaining flight.

The crew dimmed the cockpit lights and turned on the landing lights to see outside. "It looks like we're entering the cloud cover. It would have been good to climb now; it's going to be turbulent for my rest."

At 2:00 a.m., the relief first officer returned from his rest break. The captain left for his, without providing a proper briefing. Consequently, the first officer, now the pilot flying in the right seat and the designated pilot in command in the captain's absence, informed the relief first officer about the inability to climb and anticipated turbulence ahead.

Similar to recent encounters, six minutes later, the two first officers notified the cabin crew of the upcoming turbulence expected in 2 minutes. The turbulence ahead turned out to be moderate. Despite having the autopilot engaged, the bank angle fluctuated between roughly 3° to the right and 5° to the left.

The first officer adjusted the radar gain setting to increase its sensitivity and suggested a deviation to the left. They turned the aircraft 12° left of the intended track to avoid the worst of the weather. Two minutes later, the aircraft encountered an updraft; a sound typical of ice crystals hitting the fuselage was heard. The pitot tubes started picking up ice particles.

Normally, this would not be a problem, but if the concentration of crystals is high enough, they can clog them faster than the built-in heaters can melt them. The A330 has three pitot tubes—one each for the captain, the first officer, and the standby instruments. Each pitot tube measures the pressure of the oncoming air, which is then compared to the static pressure to derive the plane's air speed.

This data, in turn, is used to calculate a number of other parameters including Mach number, vertical speed, and altitude, which are all displayed instantaneously to the pilots. But if ice crystals clog the pitot tubes, air cannot enter them, causing the measured pressure to drop, which in turn causes a decrease in indicated air speed.

On flight 447, as all three pitot tubes filled up with ice, the air speed readings quickly became invalid and fell from 275 to 139 knots. This started a chain reaction of problems. The autopilot disconnected, and the flight director bars disappeared. The aircraft's flight control law changed from normal to alternate, leading to the shutdown of many built-in protections such as angle of attack, overspeed, and bank angle protection. Therefore, the aircraft became more sensitive to roll inputs.

"I have the controls!" The aircraft rolled right, and the first officer began hand-flying the aircraft, making nose-up and left roll inputs. The auto thrust disconnected and went into thrust lock mode, freezing the power setting at 83%. The pitch attitude rose to 6°, and the vertical speed increased through 1,800 ft per minute, triggering the stall warning.

A stall happens when the aircraft's wings can no longer generate enough lift. This loss of lift leads to a sudden decrease in the aircraft's ability to stay airborne, causing it to drop or lose altitude rapidly. The first officer struggled to regain control over the bank angle and overcontrolled the roll input. With a series of left and right banks, the control inputs were exactly out of phase with the roll motion.

After a challenging period, he gradually managed to stabilize the roll over the next 30 seconds, which silenced the stall warning. Just seconds later, the air speed indicated on the standby instrument began to decay once more, dropping sharply from 270 to 73 knots. The aircraft's pitch increased by 11°, and its vertical speed increased through 6,000 ft per minute.

The first officer continued to make nose-up inputs, and the pitch attitude increased to 16°. A series of small roll movements began. He counted each with lateral stick input. The stall warning was triggered again, and amidst the chaos, attempts were made to call the captain back by ringing a call chime in the crew rest area.

The stall angle of attack was reached, causing the aircraft to shake as it entered an aerodynamically unstable condition. Thrust was increased to try to stabilize it. The first officer continued to make nose-up inputs, resulting in the aircraft maintaining a shallow climb. "I'll try to touch the lateral controls as little as possible."

The rolling continued, and the first officer's inputs increased, using up to full left and right stick inputs to counteract them. The ice blocking the pitot tubes had melted, and all three air speed indicators displayed the correct readings of around 180 knots. It became clear that they were flying too slowly for this flight level, as the normal air speed for their flying altitude was about 260 knots.

Seconds later, the aircraft reached its maximum altitude of almost 38,000 ft. It had gained 3,000 ft in just 1 minute and 7 seconds since the autopilot disconnected. The bank angle increased to the right. The first officer held full left stick, with virtually no effect on the bank angle.

"I don't have control of the aircraft anymore! I don't have control of the aircraft at all!"

"Controls to the left!" The relief first officer made two full left control inputs. The first officer kept his control stick fully to the left and pulled it all the way back for nearly 40 seconds. The descent rate increased to 10,000 ft per minute; the pitch attitude fluctuated between about 10° and 16° nose up.

Two minutes after the autopilot disconnected, the captain entered the cockpit. The indicated air speeds dropped below 60 knots, which made the angle of attack sensors invalid and silenced the stall warning. As the speeds fell below 30 knots, a red SPD flag replaced the air speed indication. Despite the first officer's side stick being full left in an attempt to control it, the aircraft was tilted to the right, with bank angles fluctuating up to 45°.

"What are you doing? What's happening? I don't know what's happening! We're losing control of the aircraft here! We lost all control of the aircraft!"

The pitch attitude posed from 8° to 15° nose up. The thrust levers were moved to idle, and the nose pitched down. Each time the nose pitched down, the angle of attack reduced slightly. The air speed indication reappeared, and the stall warning reactivated. "I have the impression that we have some crazy speed."

The first officer deployed the speed brakes, causing the nose to pitch up level with the horizon. The relief first officer told him not to extend the speed brakes, and they were retracted. As a result, the nose returned to 8° below the horizon before pitching up again.

The aircraft continued to descend, with vertical speeds between 10,000 and 15,000 ft per minute. The thrust levers were moved to the climb power setting, and for the first time in a minute, the aircraft's wings briefly became level, indicating a straight flight path. However, this was only temporary, as the aircraft continued to sway left and right, prompting the first officer to make significant movements with the side stick to counteract each roll movement and stabilize the aircraft.

As the aircraft descended through 20,000 ft, the thrust levers were moved from the climb detent to toga. Shortly after, the aircraft began to roll to the right. Full left side stick input was applied once again and held steady for 20 seconds.

"We're there! We're passing level 100." They had already descended 28,000 ft at that time. "Wait, I have the controls!" The relief first officer made a left input for about 7 seconds, but the first officer never released his side stick input.

"What is... how come we're continuing to go down?" The relief first officer instructed the captain to see if a reset of the flight control computers could help. The captain remarked that it would not do anything, but he reset the primary and secondary flight control computers anyway.

"9,000 ft! Climb! Climb! Climb! Climb!"

"I've been at max nose up for a while."

"No, no, no! Don't climb, so go down!"

The relief first officer pushed his own stick forward while the thrust levers were pulled back to climb power. The first officer, however, continued to pull back, and dual input sounded again.

"Me! The controls! The controls to me!"

"Go ahead, you have the controls!"

The relief first officer lowered the nose to 7° below the horizon. The air speeds and stall warning were displayed once more. Seven seconds later, despite the relief first officer saying he had the controls, the first officer began to pull back on the side stick again.

Dual input was announced, and the aircraft started to pitch up. "Dual input! Watch out! Up! I'm pitching up! I'm pitching up!"

The thrust levers were pulled back to idle for 2 seconds, and the nose pitched up to 16°. "You're pitching up!"

"Well, we need to! We are at 4,000 ft!" Seconds later, as the aircraft reached 2,500 ft, the ground proximity warning sounded in the cockpit.

"Go on! Pull! Pull up! Pull up! Pull up!"

The thrust levers were moved to toga, and both pilots applied a nose-up command as the aircraft pitched up towards 16° again. Then the first officer pushed the take-over button on his side stick, cutting out the relief first officer's commands.

"We're going to crash! This can't be true!"

The aircraft dropped from 38,000 ft to sea level in just 3 minutes and 30 seconds. Tragically, all passengers and crew on board lost their lives, making it one of the most tragic days in aviation history.

Let us take a moment to reflect on the profound impact of this event and remember those who were lost before we continue with the investigation part.

Shortly after 4 in the morning, when the flight had failed to contact Air Traffic Control in either Sagal or Cape Verde, the controller in Sagal attempted to contact the aircraft. Despite his attempts, he received no response. Brazil and Sagal alerted rescue services, initiating the search for the aircraft.

However, the challenge was that Air France flight 447 had seemingly disappeared in a region lacking radar coverage, with no possibility of witnesses and with inconsistent radio communication. Two days later, Brazilian planes spotted what appeared to be an oil slick and light floating debris. A couple of days afterward, search teams discovered two bodies along with personal belongings.

The final resting place of flight 447 was discovered on April 3rd, 2011, at a depth of almost 4,000 meters. By May 10th, both black boxes had been found and were sent for analysis by the BEA, France's air safety agency.

In July 2012, the BEA published the final report on this accident. The investigation unveiled a temporary discrepancy in the measured speeds, likely triggered by the obstruction of the pitot probes due to ice crystals. As a result, the autopilot disconnected, and the flight control mode transitioned to alternate law.

This action deactivated several built-in protections such as angle of attack, overspeed, and bank angle protection. Consequently, the aircraft became more responsive to roll inputs, as outlined in the associated procedure.

The pilots were expected to swiftly diagnose and address the issue with preventive measures on pitch attitude and thrust. However, the failure unexpectedly occurred during cruise flight, surprising the pilots. This resulted in excessive roll handling inputs and a sudden nose-up maneuver.

The aircraft entered a sustained stall, indicated by the stall warning and strong buffet. The stall warning and the buffeting were not identified, even after having sounded continuously for 54 seconds. The crew never attempted a recovery maneuver to exit the stall, ultimately leading to the crashing into the ocean.

The fact that they never made a recovery maneuver was likely a result of a lack of specific training. Although it met regulatory standards, manual aircraft handling cannot be improvised; it necessitates precise and measured inputs on the flight controls.

Examination of their last training records and check rides made it clear that the co-pilots had not been trained for manual aircraft handling of approach to stall and stall recovery at high altitude. On the basis of the findings from the investigation, the BEA issued several recommendations, including the following:

Reviewing check and training programs to ensure they include mandatory exercises focus on setting up specific and regular drills for manual aircraft handling during stall approaches and recovery, even at high altitude.

Furthermore, aircraft undertaking public transport flights with passengers must be equipped with an image recorder that allows for observation of the entire instrument panel. In addition, several other recommendations were proposed, such as suggestions for the flight recorders, the pitot probes, better task sharing in case of augmented crews, and the installation of an angle of attack indicator.

In conclusion, it is evident that no single interpretation fully explains the actions of the crew. In the meantime, it would be beneficial even for non-pilots to reflect on the events of Air France flight 447. Let's prioritize learning from others to ensure safer skies for everyone.

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